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THE COMPLAINT IN LIBEL AND SLANDER:
A DILEMMA FOR PLAINTIFF
Joseph E. Wyse*
F ANY BRANCH of the law may be open to the charge that form
reigns supreme over substance, it must be said that the accu-
sation would be an apt one to level against the law of libel and
slander. It is not the writer's purpose to heap additional abuse
upon an already well-criticized topic,1 but rather to illustrate how
an insistence upon formalized and stilted rules has imposed a
burden upon the plaintiff in a defamation action which, in many
worthy cases, could prove to be insuperable.
The interest protected and the remedy afforded by the law
of libel and slander may be briefly summarized by saying that one
whose reputation has been harmed by another's untrue and un-
privileged accusation is entitled to recover from the defamer
for the damage thereby suffered. When attempting to recover
such damages, however, the plaintiff is met with the initial task
of preparing a complaint which would be adequate to set forth
every element material to his case. While the preparation of a
good complaint is an important step in every action, this task,
in a suit for defamation, presents the most serious obstacle in
the plaintiff's path to recovery. It is here that he will be con-
J. D., DePaul University College of Law. Member, Illnois Bar; Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
I The inconsistencies and downright absurdities to be found in the law of libel and
slander have been criticized by Pollock, Prosser and others. See, for example,
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1941), p. 777
et seq.
2 One will not have proceeded very far along in the study of libel and slander law
before he will meet the somewhat ambiguous word "defamation." Digests and legal
encyclopedias generally classify material in this field under the heading of Libel
and Slander, principally because this is the verbiage used by the courts. Con-
temporary textbook and casebook authors, however, generally introduce the ma-
terial as a discussion of the law of Defamation. Apparently, "defamation" Is a
generic term designed to signify any Invasion of reputation without indicating how
the invasion was. achieved. The terms "libel" and "slander," on the other hand,
connote invasions of reputation brought about by writing or the like and by speak-
ing, respectively.
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fronted with pleading requirements of such arbitrary and techni-
cal nature as to make the work of framing a complaint capable
of withstanding a motion to strike or dismiss the suit3 a most
ticklish and difficult responsibility. The material which follows
is a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of such a complaint, offered
with the hope of spotlighting the pitfalls which are certain to trap
the unwary.
4
As a preliminary matter, it is important to distinguish libel
from slander, for the necessary allegations will vary slightly de-
pending on the method used to defame. Historically, the term
"libel" has been used to signify a written, printed, or similar
form of defamation, 5 while "slander" has referred to an oral
defamation.' Since writing had more permanence than oral com-
munication, had a potentially greater circulation and was thought
the more likely to be believed, a cause of action for libel was
formerly, and is to a lesser degree today, more favored than one
for slander,7 although neither has received any marked degree
of favorable treatment at the hands of courts. With the advent
of modern and more subtle means of communication, such as
motion pictures, radio and television broadcasting, courts have
been presented with vexing problems of classification. Instead of
treating these problems as being sui generis, the courts have en-
deavored to rationalize doubtful issues arising from defamation
proceeding over these newer vehicles of communication by resort
to older tests.8 The pleader must, therefore, resolve his doubts
3 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 169, authorizes the use of a motion where,
under the older practice, a demurrer would have been appropriate.
4 For reasons of clarity rather than brevity, important defensive problems with
respect to matters of privilege, truth and mitigation of damages are not discussed
herein in detail.
5 Actually, the term is quite broad, having been enlarged to Include defamation
through the medium of such things as pictures, signs, statues, hanging in effigy.
etc. See Prosser, op. cit., pp. 794-5.
6 Prosser, op. cit., p. 794.
7 Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N. J. L. 695, 61 A. (2d) 143, 5 A. L. R. (2d) 951 (1948).
8 See Current Trends in State Legislation (University of Michigan Law School,
Ann Arbor, 1952), p. 4, and note in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 142-9. But see
Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. (2d) 302, 124
A. L. R. 968 (1939), where liability of a broadcasting company for an "ad lib"
radio remark was said to rest upon a showing of negligence. See also Kelly v.
Hoffman, 137 N. J. L. 695, 61 A. (2d) 143, 5 A. L. R. (2d) 951 (1948), where radio
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in this regard before undertaking the vexatious task of preparing
the complaint.
Turning now to the complaint, the eminent Mr. Chitty once
said that "a declaration must allege all the circumstances neces-
sary to support the action and contain a full, regular and methodi-
cal statement of the injury which the plaintiff has sustained.'' 9
After substituting the word "complaint" for the term "declara-
tion," and after having made due allowance for those changes
produced by modern procedural methods,10 his summarization
forms an excellent place from which to begin this discussion, since
it emphasizes that regard must be had both for the facts, that is
the matter to be stated, and for the mode of expression, i.e., the
manner of alleging those facts. So far as the matter to be pleaded
is concerned, every fact or circumstance which would be necessary
to entitle the plaintiff to recover ought to be disclosed since the
plaintiff would have no case, were all or any one of these absent.
But even if all the necessary facts were presented, the bare state-
ment thereof might still be inadequate since the assembled ma-
terials must be articulated in the appropriate legal jargon, with
enough factual detail to avoid the criticism that the pleader had
charged no more than his conclusions.
In that connection, a complaint in defamation would probably
divide into two, or possibly three, distinct parts, each differing
in character and function but within which the several elements
of the cause of action would be made to appear. These three
main divisions would deal with matters of inducement, with the
gravamen or gist of the complaint, and where necessary, with
broadcasting was likened to dissemination by a bookseller or by -the proprietdr of a
news-stand, the latter being liable only for negligence. Defamation by means of
motion pictures was classed as libel in Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp., 240 App.
Div. 520, 270 N. Y. S. 544 (1934), and Youssopoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 50 Times
L. R. 581, 99 A. L. R. 864 (England, 1934). By contrast, liability for the remarks
of a guest panelist on a television show was said, in Remington v. Bentley, 88 F.
Supp. 166 (1949), to be governed by the law of slander.
9 Chitty, Pleading, 13th Am. Ed., VoL 1, p. 255.
10 Despite abolition of the names and other formal requisites of the older remedies,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 155, still provides that "this section shall not
be deemed to affect in any way the substantial averments of fact necessary" to
state any cause of action.
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matters offered by way of aggravation. In some tort complaints,
the first of these divisions would be unnecessary since the mere
statement of the acts performed by the defendant would be
enough to disclose a case" but, in other and more complicated
statements, acts not intrinsically injurious may become so only
by reason of particular circumstances. In such instances, the facts
extrinsic to the actual wrong, but which are needed to render it
a wrong and to develop its wrongfulness, must be pleaded and
are usually offered by way of introduction or inducement.2 As
this is likely to be true of complaints based on defamation, par-
ticularly in those instances where the defamatory effect is not
produced by the bare words used but results from the circum-
stances in which the words were used, the complaint, after the
customary opening paragraph which serves to identify the plain-
tiff and the defendant, 13 should proceed with these introductory
matters.
Among the items invariably mentioned in this part of the com-
plaint is the fact that the plaintiff was and always had been a
person of good name, credit and reputation in the community.
14
Sometimes there is added the further statement that this good
reputation was well deserved 5 Neither of these allegations is
traversable 6 and the plaintiff is not initially required to offer
11 Thus, in a complaint based on assault and battery, the simple statement that
the defendant "beat and struck the plaintiff" would suffice since, from that simple
allegation, all other pertinent elements, such as the fact that the plaintiff was a
human being and enjoyed a right of bodily security, would be Inferred.
12 Thus, where Incontinence Is not criminal unless one of the parties was married,
a speech imputing such indiscretion to the plaintiff would not be actionable unless
it had first been alleged that the plaintiff, or the plaintiff's paramour, was a married
person: Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225, 23 L. Ed. 308 (1876).
13 See forms of introduction set out in Ill. Civ. Prac. Act Anno. (1933), pp. 16-7.
14 Form No. 30, a complaint for slander upon words actionable per se, appearing
in Ill. Civ. Prac. Act Anno. (1933), appendix p. 34, omits this allegation. But com-
pare with Form No. 31, for a slander imputing dishonesty to a lawyer in relation to
his professional activities, which includes the statement that the plaintiff "enjoyed a
reputation for honesty, integrity and skill in his profession."
15 These twin allegations of good reputation and the merit thereof point up an-
other verbal distinction often blurred in the cases. The law of libel and slander
protects reputation, that is, the opinion which others have of the plaintiff. This
is made clear by the requirement that, to be actionable, the accusation must have
been communicated to someone other than the plaintiff. See note 21, post. Never-
theless, Newell, Slander and Libel (1924), 4th Ed. § 8, speaks of imputations affect-
ing the plaintiff's character. It should be borne in mind that the word character,
as there used, is synonymous with reputation.
16 Newell, op. cit., § 59.3.
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proof to sustain them.17 The omission of these allegations would
probably be a matter of little consequence. Good practice, however,
would dictate their use if for no other reason than to emphasize
the fact that it is the purpose of this branch of the law to pro-
tect reputation.
If the defamatory matter names the plaintiff by his proper
name and contains other identifying characteristics by which it
can be seen that the same refers to, and only to, the plaintiff, no
further matter of inducement would be needed. It could happen
that the defamatory remark, while intended to cast opprobrium
on the plaintiff, did so in some veiled fashion. This might be
done by the use of some descriptive term designed to refer to
the plaintiff without naming him by his true name 8 or by attrib-
uting acts to him which, on the basis of the words used, would
superficially appear to be of innocuous character. 19 In that event,
a carefully worded introduction by way of inducement would be
essential as a predicate to the second portion of the complaint.
The bulk of the complaint for defamation will consist of the
gravamen of the charge. Here it will be necessary to charge, in
positive fashion, that the defendant did (1) with malice, (2) utter
a defamatory remark, set forth in verbatim fashion, (3) of and
concerning the plaintiff20 (4) in the presence of divers other per-
17 In an action for defamation, the plaintiff's reputation, as an individual at least,
is presumed to be good: Hahnemannian Life Ins. Co. v. Beebe, 48 Ill. 87 (1868) ; 53
C. J. S., Libel and Slander, § 210, p. 317. The plaintiff may offer evidence on the
point only after his reputation has been attacked by the defendant in an effort to
mitigate damages: Harbison v. Shook, 41 111. 141 (1866).
18 In Steele v. Sonthwick, 9 Johnson 214 (New York, 1812), for example, the
alleged defamatory statement was: "The man at the sign of the Bible Is no slouch
at swearing to an old story." By way of Inducement, the plaintiff alleged that he
was a bookseller and had a business sign on his premises in the image of a book on
which appeared the word Bible. On demurrer, the allegation was held to be sufficient.
19 In the illustration last mentioned, the statement that the plaintiff was no
slouch at. "swearing to an old story" possessed no particular significance until
linked up with the fact that the plaintiff had recently been a witness in another
case, from which an Innuendo might be drawn that the plaintiff had there com-
mitted perjury. Reference to this prior testimony by way of inducement would be
essential to state a case.
20 Not emphasized is the requirement that the defendant must have been speaking
or writing of and concerning the plaintiff. Usually, the defendant's words will
manifestly refer to the plaintiff. If this is not so, a simple allegation, called a col-
loquium, to the effect that defendant published the matter "of and concerning the
plaintiff" would suffice: Chitty, Pleading, 13th Am. Ed., Vo. 1, pp. 403-4.
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sons, 21 (5) which charge was false, but which (6) was calculated
to produce a particular effect in the minds of those who heard
or saw it. Where necessary, the gravamen should also reveal the
necessary facts to show compliance with venue requirements.22
Enlargement upon these several points follows hereafter.
As to the first, a vital allegation, the plaintiff is usually re-
quired to do no more than characterize the defamatory remark
as having been "maliciously" spoken or published" since, to do
more, might require the pleading of evidentiary facts and would
result in an unnecessary extension of the complaint.24 But much
confusion has arisen about the part which malice plays in the
modern law on the subject. Many old cases contain the statement
that malice is the gist of the action for libel or slander; which
phrase is also occasionally found in recent cases. The statement
was literally true in the early days when libel and slander were
emerging as separate torts.25 Today, however, it is distinctly un-
true in any material sense for two reasons. In the first place, the
plaintiff has the benefit of a presumption that the defamatory
statement made about him was uttered maliciously, which presump-
tion is not rebuttable unless the defendant shows that he had a
privilege to publish the matter.26 This presumption is no more than
21 No emphasis has been placed, in this article, on the element of publication.
Of course, the plaintiff's complaint would be defective unless it appeared from an
examination thereof that the defendant's accusation was communicated to someone
other than the plaintiff: Chaloupka v. Lacina, 301 Ill. App. 173, 21 N. E. (2d) 909
(1939); Wiese v. Melssner, 171 Ill. App. 597 (1912). The fact of publication is
usually evident from the surrounding circumstances, as where the statement ap-
peared In a newspaper. If this is not so, the element of publication would probably
be satisfied by an allegation as simple as that noted: Edmunds, Illinois Civil
Practice Forms (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1933), Vol. 2, p. 1103. The defendant
may apply for a bill of particulars In order to learn who these "divers other
persons" were. If so, one would have to be furnished, where possible, under penalty
of dismissal of the suit if not forthcoming: American Rolling Mill Corp. v. Ohio
Iron & Metal Co., 120 Ill. App. 614 (1905).
22 See, In particular, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§ 131 and 131a.
23 As to the meaning of this term, see post, notes 26 to 28.
24 In Forms 30 and 31, IlL Civ. Prac. Act Anno. (1933), appendix p. 34, the
phrase appears as "the defendant maliciously spoke of the plaintiff." A more ex-
tended form of expression appears in Keigwin, Common Law Pleading (Lawyers
Co-operative Publishing Co., Rochester, 1934), 2d Ed., p. 325.
25 Prosser, op. cit., p. 815.
26 Gilmer v. Eubank, 13 IlL 271 (1851) ; Newell, op. cit., § 526; 53 C. J. S., Libel
and Slander, §§ 76-8, pp. 125-7.
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a pure fiction designed to obscure the fact that malice, in the
sense of ill will or spite, is no longer a vital part of the plaintiff's
case, at least in the first instance. Secondly, it has now been
reasonably well established that libel and slander are torts of
strict liability.2" It seems clear, therefore, that the defendant's
state of mind is immaterial, at least in the absence of a claim
of privilege, which claim could not be advanced until after the
plaintiff's complaint had been filed.29 But, in view of the con-
flicting and confusing statements about malice to be found in the
cases, it would be folly to omit an allegation with respect to
malice from the complaint.
Much care must be exercised in setting forth the second es-
sential allegation, which has to do with the text of the disparage-
ment directed against the plaintiff. At this place, the plaintiff will
be obliged to set forth, in verbatim form and between quotation
marks, the exact words uttered by the defendant which are claimed
to be defamatory. 0 Not only is the allegation essential but strict
proof thereof will be required at the trial.8 1 To avoid the possibil-
ity of variance, particularly since fallible human beings seldom
hear alike or remember things evenly, the defamatory matter,
27 Prosser, op. cit., pp. 815-6. This statement may have to be limited to cases
where the words used are actionable per se, since cases found in Illinois, as well as
in other jurisdictions, are replete with statements to the effect that, where the
defendant's charge is not actionable per ae, the plaintiff must plead and prove actual
malice: Tiernan v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 1 Ill. App. (2d) 150, 116 N. E.
(2d) 896 (1953) ; Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N. E.
(2d) 751 (1954). See also Newell, op. cit., § 675; 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander,
§ 78, p. 127. The difficulty, as will be demonstrated later, lies in determining what
is meant by the phrase "actionable per 8e."
28 Prosser, op. cit., p. 816 et seq.
29 Two other matters might inject the defendant's mental state Into the con-
troversy. While truth was a complete defense at common law according to the case
of Tilton v. Maley, 186 Ill. App. 307 (1914), many jurisdictions now permit truth as
a defense only if the defendant has acted with good motives and for justifiable
ends. Illinois is numbered among the latter: Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 4; Cook v.
East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N. E. (2d) 751 (1945). In
addition, the lack of actual malice may be shown by defendant In mitigation of
damages: Tottleben v. Blankenship, 58 Ill. App. 47 (1894) ; 53 C. J. S., Libel and
Slander, § 252, p. 369.
30 Brown v. Glicksteln, 347 Ill. App. 486, 107 N. E. (2d) 267 (1952) ; Chitty, op.
cit., Vol. 1, p. 404.
51 See, for example, the cases of Wilborn v. Odell, 29 Ill. 456 (1862), and Sanford
v. Gaddis, 15 Ill. 229 (1853).
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if orally uttered, should be stated in a variety of ways.82 The task
of pleading the exact words uttered is, however, not difficult
where, as is true today in most suits charging defamation, the
matter has appeared in print.
33
It must, of course, appear to the court that the words so set
forth are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning' for, if
they are not, the complaint will be bad and will be dismissed. It
is over this question, and the question as to whether or not the
damages have been well pleaded, that the courts have been most
rigid and strict. Since these two problems are inseparably linked
together, they will be discussed but once. Inasmuch as neither
courts nor law will be concerned with trifles, a defamatory com-
munication, to be actionable, must represent a serious imputation.
It was well-established law several hundred years ago, and is
still the law today, that only special damages-meaning a loss
readily measurable in monetary terms-can be recovered for a
slander. 5 If, however, the slanderous remark fell into one or more
of certain limited categories, known as slanders per se, general
damages would be presumed. 6
The importance of these rules becomes striking if one ap-
32 One count should be enough, with the varied allegations being set forth in much
the same way as is true of the several acts or omissions charged in a negligence
action: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §259.12. If confusion would be
generated, separate counts could be used.
33 There is some doubt whether Section 36 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.
relating to exhibits, would be applicable. If the term "written instrument," as used
therein, extends to more than contractual instruments, then the printed defamatory
matter would meet the description, permitting the attachment of a reproduction of
the defamatory matter as an exhibit, since the action would be founded thereon.
In any event, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 169, the text could be
recited in haec verba in the body of the complaint.
34 Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N. E. 587 (1919) ; Lodge
v. Hampton, 116 Ill. App. 414 (1904) ; Restatement, Torts, Vol. 3, § 614.
35 Wright v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 281 I1. App. 495 (1935) ; Newell, op. cit., §721.
36 The categories of slander per se at common law, still applicable today unless
changed by statute, were: (1) words imputing the commission of a criminal offense;
(2) words that imputed affliction with some contagious disease, where the accusa-
tion, if true, would exclude the plaintiff from society; (3) words which impute
unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment of profit, or the want of
Integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment; (4) words
which prejudice the plaintiff in his profession or trade: Wright v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 281 Ill. App. 495 (1935). To this list should be added: (5) words charging
fornication or adultery; and (6) words charging one with false swearing, both of
which have been made actionable in Illinois by statute: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2,
Ch. 126, §§ 1-2.
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preciates the fact that only rarely does a defamatory imputation
occasion a money loss. In fact, it has been said by one text writer
that the task of proving special damages in libel and slander cases
is one of the most difficult in law.37 Practically speaking, therefore,
to require a plaintiff to plead and prove special damage is to
deal a death blow to his cause of action in most cases. On the
other hand, where libel was involved, the courts dealing with the
early cases were most liberal, holding that, from the publication
of a libel, general damages would be presumed to flow.38 The effect
was to allow plaintiffs, in such cases, to recover substantial
amounts from defendants without being obliged to show, and often
without having been forced to suffer, so much as a single penny
of out-of-pocket loss. It was not to be expected that such benevo-
lence would long prevail but, as is so often the case with cures,
the remedy left the law of libel in a far more confused and rigid
state than it had originally been.
The first innovation attempted by the courts was to adapt
to libel cases the phraseology and reasoning of slander law. Dur-
ing the nineteenth century there began to appear, in libel deci-
sions, the concept of "libel per se," a phrase so similar to "slan-
der per se" as to suggest a conscious turning to slander law for
the terminology. It appears that the courts first used this term
to signify a libel which was most serious in character and would
almost certainly cause damage to reputation. From such serious
accusations, therefore, general damages were presumed to flow.39
37 Morris, Torts (The Foundation Press, Inc., Brooklyn, 195), p. 290.
38 McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages (West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
1985), p. 416. The same rule has been announced in Illinois for imputations which
could be said to be libelous per se but, as to libels not falling within this category,
referred to as libels per quod, pleading and proof of special damages is still neces-
sary: Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N. E. (2d) 751
(1945). Note, however, that the phrase "libelous per 8e" is fraught with ambiguity,
as will appear later herein. It is vitally important to distinguish the task of proving
special damages from that of proving general damages. In the former, plaintiff
must show wherein he has suffered an actual loss of money, by allegation and proof
that, for example, he lost a job, a profitable business, or the like; specifying when,
where, and to what extent the loss was suffered. Where general damages are pre-
sumed, the jury is free to return a sizable verdict on the simple assumption that
the plaintiff's reputation must have suffered: McCormick, op. cit., p. 421 et seq.
39 That courts, at times, have used the term libel per se to indicate a charge most
serious in nature, as contrasted with charges of less serious import, see Isham,
"Libel Per Se and Libel Per Quod in Ohio," 15 Ohio L. 3. 303 (1954), and McCor-
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In the case of other and less serious libels, referred to as libels
per quod, special damages had to be pleaded and proved before
recovery could be had.
At this stage of development, the law of libel could have
merged with the law of slander because discrepancies between the
two were fast disappearing. All that remained to accomplish that
result was for the courts to define libel per se by reference to
the categories previously established for slander per se. At least
one court has done just that,40 but the overwhelming attitude of
the courts is that an imputation may be actionable per se if made
in writing, while the same charge, uttered orally, would require
a showing of special damage to permit recovery."' A glance at
any list of imputations which have been held to be libels per se,
however, will show that most of them would have been slanders
per se if made orally. It is, therefore, clear that a convenient
rule-of-thumb to determine whether or not a particular charge
is a libel per se would be to see if it would be a slander per se had
it been orally uttered.
Since the category known as libel per se is not as narrow
and confined as slander per se, it might well be asked what is the
ultimate criterion of libel per se? Bearing in mind that the early
English and American cases, as well as text writers, had on many
occasions defined the term "libel," 2 it might have been expected
mick, op. cit., p. 417, note 6. It is the opinion of the writer that Illinois has, in the
past, and probably still does today use the term libel per se in the sense indicated
herein. The phrase itself probably first appeared in the case of Brown v. Burnett,
10 fli. App. 279 (1881). It was not used in its secondary sense, as designed to
indicate a charge the defamatory meaning of which appears entirely on the face of
the words, until the decision in LaGrange Press v. Citizen Pub. Co., 252 Ill. App. 482
(1929), cert. den. 256 Ill. App. xlviii.
40 Hudson v. Slack Furniture Co., 318 Ill. App. 15, 47 N. E. (2d) 502- (1943).
41 Holtz v. Alton Telegraph Printing Co., 324 Ill. App. 1, 57 N. U. (2d) 137 (1944);
Wright v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 281 Il. App. 495 (1935) ; White v. Borquin, 204
Ill. App. 83 (1917) ; 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander, § 8, p. 45.
42 The definition framed by Newell in 1898 would appear to be representative. He
wrote that "any publication, expressed either by printing or writing or by signs,
pictures or effigies or the like, which tends to injure one's reputation in the common
estimation of mankind, to throw contumely, shame or disgrace upon him, or which
tends to hold him up to scorn, ridicule or contempt, or which is calculated to render
him infamous, odious or ridiculous, is prima facie a libel, and implies malice in its
publication. So, also, is any publication injurious to private character, or that re-
flects upon his character, or that injures social character, or that induces an ill
opinion, or that imputes a bad reputation; and so with all defamatory words injuri-
ous in their nature." Newell, Libel and Slander (1898), 2d Ed., § 3.
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that these courts which adopted the notion of libel per se would
promulgate their own nomenclature. This has not been the case,
however, so the older definitions are still quoted for this purpose.
43
One interesting feature of the problem, though, is the frequency
with which statutes defining the criminal offense of libel are cited
as determining the limits of libel per se for civil purposes. Thus,
the section of the Illinois Criminal Code on the point" has been
repeatedly referred to 45 even though there may be some reason
to question the propriety of applying, in civil actions, a legislative
standard enacted for criminal prosecutions.46 It might be said,
however, that the practice has been followed for too long a time
to cause much concern and, in addition, the statutory definition
is probably not materially different from the standard evolved by
judges and text writers.
47
Another, but by no means identical, use of the term libel per
se has crept into the law of many American jurisdictions in the
form of a rule of pleading. Thus, it has often been said that, to
be a libel per se, it is not enough that the charge be of a sufficiently
serious nature but, in addition, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing the defamatory meaning by reference to the words
alone, unaided by extrinsic circumstances. 48 No better exposition
43 The case of Cobbs v. The Chicago Defender, 308 Ill. App. 55, 31 N. E. (2d) 323
(1941), relies upon the definition of libel provided by Newell. In Davis v. Ferguson.
246 Ill. App. 318 (1927), the court drew upon definitions of libel per 8e to be found
in Corpus Juris and Townshend, Libel and Slander.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 402, states: "A libel is a malicious defama-
tion, expressed either by printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue
or reputation or publish the natural defects of one who Is alive, and thereby to
expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury." See also Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 404.1, et seq., for the offense defined as libel by
radio.
45 Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. (2d) 619, 171 A. L. R. 699 (1947) ; Ogren v. Rockford
Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N. E. 587 (1919) ; Cook v. East Shore News-
papers, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N. E. (2d) 751 (1945) ; Burns v. Hicks, 242 Ill.
App. 198 (1926).
46 In that respect, see Thayer, "Public Wrong and Private Action," 27 Harv. L.
Rev. 317 (1914).
47 Compare, for this purpose, the statutory definition as to criminal libel contained
in note 44, ante, with the definition as to civil libel appearing In note 42, ante.
48 Prosser, op. cit., p. 798, note 61, indicates that the states of Kansas, Kentucky,
Oklahoma, Montana and North Dakota have adopted this rule. To the list of cases
from these jurisdictions, the following may be added: Harrison v. Burger, 212 Ala.
670. 103 So. 842, 25 A. L. R. 1148 (1925) ; Ilitzky v. Goodman. 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P.
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of the problem can be found than that offered in the Arizona case
of Ilitsky v. Goodman49 where the court said:
The question is whether the letters above referred to were
libelous. Written communications which are claimed to be
libelous fall into one of three classes: (a) those which on
their face and without the aid of any extrinsic matter come
within the definition above set forth, (b) those which on their
face do not fall within the definition but which by reason of
special circumstances actually do, and (c) those which even
though aided by the surrounding circumstances cannot rea-
sonably be held to fall within it.
Class (a) is called "libelous per se" because it needs no
allegation or existence of extraneous surrounding circum-
stances to make it such. Communications of this kind are
assumed to cause damage, and no special damages need be
alleged. Class (b) comprises those statements which on their
face are not libelous but by reason of certain surrounding
circumstances are actually such. These circumstances may be
such as are known to the general public or are known only to
the persons to whom the communication is published, but in
either case in a complaint for libel they must be followed by
what is commonly called a colloquium or innuendo setting
forth both the extraneous circumstances and the reason why
under such circumstances the communication, otherwise in-
nocent, becomes libelous. In this case no damages are pre-
sumed, but they must be specially alleged and proved. Class
(c) comprises those communications which are not only in-
nocent on their face, but have no attendant circumstances
which would render them libelous.5
(2d) 860 (1941); Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal. App. (2d) 581, 126 P. (2d) 668
(1942); Dalton v. Woodward, 134 Neb. 915, 280 N. W. 215 (1938); Cardiff v.
Brooklyn Eagle, Inc., 190 Misc. 730, 75 N. Y. S. (2d) 222 (1947); Whitaker v.
Sherbrook Distrib. Co., 189 S. C. 243, 200 S. E. 848 (1939) ; Denney v. Northwestern
Credit Ass'n, 55 Wash. 331, 104 P. 769, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1021 (1909). The rule,
stated in the text and approved by the courts noted above constitutes a departure
from the common law of libel, which treated all libels as actionable without pleading
or proof of special damages: McCormick, op. cit., p. 416; Prosser, op. cit., p. 798.
49 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P. (2d) 860 (1941).
5057 Ariz. 216 at 218, 112 P. (2d) 860 at 862. The court continued: "We may
Illustrate the difference as follows. A writes a letter to B, stating 'X murdered Y.'
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These distinctions may be important for it is possible that Illinois
could well be the next state to embrace, with all its harshness,
the oppressive doctrine so enunciated.
In the recent case of Brewer v. Hearst Publishing Company,51
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was called upon to
apply relevant Illinois law in deciding whether the lower court
had acted correctly in dismissing a complaint charging libel. The
court there said that to "determine whether or not the published
article is libelous per se, we must view it stripped of all innuendo,
colloquium or extrinsic or explanatory circumstances; if the words
are unambiguous and incapable of an innocent meaning they may
be declared libelous as a matter of law."52 It would probably be
useless to point out that the cases cited in support of the foregoing
quotation do not stand for the rule enunciated, since identical
language can be found in at least one Illinois Appellate Court
decision not even mentioned by the Court of Appeals.53
To grasp the real import of the rule so stated, it now becomes
necessary to define the words "inducement," "colloquium," and
"innuendo." 54 The first of these terms has already been discussed
and refers to the pleading of extrinsic circumstances which serve
to explain the sense in which the apparently innocent words were
This letter, if untrue, is libelous on its face, for it specifically accuses X of a crime,
and would be understood by all persons to do so. An illustration of (b) Is a letter
in which A says to B, 'X was the only person who was present at the home of Y
on May 1 between the hours of six and nine.' On Its face this is a perfectly innocent
and harmless statement. If, however, B knows that Y came to his death under
circumstances which show that he must have been murdered by some one in his
home between the hours above stated, the statement Is libelous because B reasonably
understands the letter as meaning that X must have been the one who murdered Y.
An Illustration of (e) is where A writes to B the same letter as set forth in the
previous example, but Y has not been murdered nor harmed, nor has any untoward
Incident occurred in regard to him at the time mentioned. The test, as can be seen
in each case, is what, under the circumstances as known to B, would the latter have
understood the letter to mean."
51185 F. (2d) 846 (1950).
52185 F. (2d) 846 at 850, citing Dowie v. Priddle, 216 Ill. 553, 75 N. E. 243
(1905), and Life Printing & Publishing Co. v. Field, 324 Ill. App. 254, 58 N. E. (2d)
307 (1944).
53 The case of LaGrange Press v. Citizen Pub. Co., 252 Ill. App. 482 (1929), cert.
den. 256 Ill. App. xlviii, contains almost identical language as that quoted.
54 An excellent exposition of the use of allegations with respect to inducement,
colloquium and Innuendo may be found in the case of People v. Spielman, 318 Ill.
482, 149 N. E. 466 (1925). While the case involved a criminal libel, the court relied
for support on Newell's discussion of the subject drawn from civil cases.
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used. 5 The second refers simply to the allegation, short yet es-
sential, that the defamatory statement was made of and concern-
ing the plaintiff and, where an inducement has been used, that
the words were uttered of and concerning the matter pleaded by
way of inducement.56 The third term requires explanation.
An innuendo is, as its lay meaning would indicate, an inter-
pretation or explanation of the meaning to be given to the words
published by the defendant. An innuendo is probably essential
where words are defamatory only because of extrinsic circum-
stances, its office being to relate the two so that the court may be
informed as to the defamatory imputation which lies hidden be-
hind the mask of innocent-appearing words. The innuendo, while
useful, is not an independent averment, hence it can only operate
to indicate the connection and the result of facts already shown.
It can fix the meaning of the words by reference to those facts,
but may not go beyond the proper limit thereof. Conversely, it
has often been stated that no innuendo is necessary where the
defamatory meaning of words is apparent from the words them-
selves, though one may be inserted to heighten the effect. 57 This
latter rule is probably sound since a defamatory connotation which
is culled from unambiguous language should be as evident to
the court as it appears to be to the plaintiff. In such a case, an
innuendo which attempted to attach an unnatural meaning to
the language used by the defendant, 8 or rested upon the existence
55 See notes 12 to 19, ante. By way of further illustration, it could be said that
to say of a woman that she had just given birth to twins would convey no defama-
tory meaning unless it were pleaded, by way of inducement, that the listeners knew
the woman was single or only recently married. This example is drawn from the
facts in the case of Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 39 Scottish L. R. 432 (1902).
56 See note 20, ante. In Savage v. Robery, 2 Salk. 694, 91 Eng. Rep. 588 (1688),
the plaintiff, a trader, averred that the defendant had said: "You are a cheat, and
have been a cheat for divers years." Judgment on a verdict for plaintiff was
arrested because, while it was charged that the words were spoken of and concern-
ing the plaintiff, the colloquium failed to charge they were also spoken of and
concerning the plaintiff in his trade, in which application only would such words
be defamatory per 8e.
57 Newell, op. cit., § 542; 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander, § 162, p. 249.
58 In Campbell v. Morris, 224 Ill. App. 569 (1922), the defendant's letter charged
plaintiff with posing as a Mason in good standing. Plaintiff interpreted this to be
an accusation that he was an Imposter. The court rejected the innuendo as being an
unnatural one.
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of extrinsic facts which had not been pleaded, would clearly be
improper.59
Returning once again to the proposition that, in determining
whether the defendant's charge is libel per se, the court may
consider only the words themselves, it will be meaningful to in-
quire as to whether Illinois has actually adopted this rule, as
the Brewer case would seem to assert. The origin for such a
harsh doctrine in Illinois would be difficult to locate.6 ° Indeed,
until late in the nineteenth century, most cases of defamation
arising within the state dealt with slander rather than libel, al-
though the converse appears to be the rule today. Probably the
first of the defamation cases in Illinois, that of Blair v. Sharp,6'
was decided in 1820. The declaration there alleged that the de-
fendant had said, of the plaintiff, that he "had swore a lie." The
Supreme Court held the declaration to be defective because the
plaintiff had failed to allege to what these words applied. A
footnote to the case, supplied by Judge Breese, who collected the
cases appearing in the first volume of the state reports, points
out that, to be liable, the defendant must have charged the plain-
tiff with committing perjury.62 The decision would seem to contain
a tacit admission by the court to the effect that extrinsic cir-
59 Voris v. Street & Smith Pub. Co., 330 Ill. App. 409, 71 N. E. (2d) 338 (1947).
The limited use to which an innuendo may be put has resulted in some reckless
statements by Illinois courts. Thus, it has been said at times that innuendoes are
not available to impute libel to an article which in itself is otherwise innocent of
any libelous meaning: Dilling v. Illinois Pub. & Printing Co., 340 Ill. App. 303,
91 N. E. (2d) 635 (1950), appeal dismissed 341 Ill. App. xv; LaGrange Press v.
Citizen Pub. Co., 252 Ill. App. 482 (1929), cert. den. 256 Ill. App. xlviii. This state-
ment would appear to be misleading In the light of language in the case of Life
Printing & Pub. Co. v. Field, 324 Ill. App. 254 at 262, 58 N. U. (2d) 307 at 311
(1944), where the court, quoting with approval from McLaughlin v. Fisher, 186 Ill.
111 at 116, 24 N. E. 60 at 62 (1890), said: "It is not permissible to enlarge and
extend the meaning of the words spoken, beyond their natural import, by the
innuendo, except so far as such enlarged meaning is warranted by prefatory matter
set forth in the inducement or colloquium. An innuendo is properly used to point
the meaning of the words alleged to have been spoken, in view of the occasion and
circumstances, whether appearing in the words themselves, or extraneous prefatory
matters alleged in the declaration." See also Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram
Distilling Corp., 288 Ill. App. 79, 5 N. E. (2d) 610 (1937).
60 The doctrine has no support in common law precedent: McCormick, op. cit., p.
416; Prosser, op. cit., p. 798.
611 In. (Breese) 30 (1820).
62 1 Ill. (Breese) 30 at 31, note (a). The case would be decided differently today
because, by statute, a charge of false swearing has been made actionable: Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 126, § 2.
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cumstances would be material in determining the sufficiency of
the declaration since only by a proper inducement and innuendo
could it be made to appear precisely to what the words referred
as, for instance, that in a legal proceeding before a court of
competent jurisdiction, in which the plaintiff, being under oath,
had testified on a matter material to the issues therein, the plain-
tiff had supposedly given false testimony.
More to the point is the case of Patterson v. Edwards,3
decided in 1845. The defendant there allegedly spoke of the
plaintiff, saying: "Mrs. Edwards has raised a family of children
by a Negroe." Plaintiff had contended that these words charged
her with fornication or adultery, but the Illinois Supreme Court
said the declaration was defective, and it reversed a verdict and
judgment of the trial court with leave to amend, because the
innuendo ascribed to these words was deemed to be improper
in the absence of other facts which should have been pleaded by
way of introduction. The court went on to say that it could
readily think of facts which the plaintiff might have averred to
accomplish this and from which the desired innuendo could have
been drawn. These two cases indicate that, at least in the earlier
slander cases, the court did not feel itself constrained by any such
rigid requirement as was later expressed in the Brewer case.
It was not until 1873 that the Illinois Supreme Court was
confronted, for the first time, with a libel case in which it was
necessary for the plaintiff to establish the defamatory meaning
by reference to extrinsic circumstances. In a case in that year,
one entitled Strader v. Snyder,64 the plaintiff had alleged a con-
siderable amount of extrinsic material, in addition to repeating
the words written by the defendant, and concluded that the words
used charged adultery. The trial court agreed with this conclu-
sion and so instructed the jury. On appeal, however, the higher
court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and ordered a new
trial, saying the words did not, in common acceptation and with-
out the aid of extrinsic matters, charge adultery. It was error,
63 7 Ill. (2 Gil.) 720 (1845).
6467 11. 404 (1873).
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therefore, concluded the court, to relieve the plaintiff of the
burden of proving the extrinsic matters which had been alleged
by him as well as the application thereof to the words used. If
anything, this case would provide ample support for the opinion
that the expressions to be found in the Brewer case were not
considered as representing the original viewpoint of the Illinois
Supreme Court.
The case of Young v. Gilbert,5 decided in 1879, did nothing
to change this view although it involved an allegedly libelous
advertisement published in a newspaper at the instance of the
defendant. The defendant contended that he had merely replied
to an advertisement previously published by the plaintiff. The
trial court excluded defendant's evidence as to the earlier adver-
tisement by plaintiff and judgment was entered for plaintiff. On
appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court, noting that the defendant's
words had an entirely different signification when read in the
light of plaintiff's prior advertisement, reversed this holding.
It said, with a degree of emphasis, that in libel and in slander
"it is important to the proper understanding of the meaning of
the words written or spoken, and of the motives and purposes of
the same, that it should be shown to the court and jury what was
the subject matter about which the defendant was writing or
speaking." 6 While, in the usual case, it is the plaintiff who wants
to show these extrinsic matters to convince the court that seem-
ingly innocent words actually operated to convey a defamatory
meaning, in the case mentioned, the argument was advanced by
a defendant to show that the damning words were actually privi-
leged. In fairness, the principle should apply alike to either
party.
It would appear that the first, and quite likely the only, case
to date in the Illinois state court system which has embraced the
doctrine later enunciated by the Brewer case is the holding of
the Appellate Court for the First District in LaGrange Press v.
65 93 1IL 595 (1879).
66 93 II. 595 at 596.
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Citizen Publishing Company. 7 In that case, the defendant had
published a story to the effect that the plaintiff newspaper had
had its application for entry to the mails turned down by the
post office department. Plaintiff's complaint had initially referred
to the federal postal laws describing nonmailable matter, which
statute bars all fraudulent or obscene publications from the mails.
Plaintiff thereafter drew the conclusion, by way of innuendo, that
reasonable readers would understand that defendant meant to
imply that plaintiff was conducting its business by fraud or
obscenity in contravention of the federal statute. The trial court
sustained a demurrer to the complaint and dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the reviewing court, after stating the facts of the
case, immediately launched into a statement of relevant law
beginning with the following: "In determining whether or not
the published article is libelous per se, we must view it stripped
of all innuendo, colloquium or extrinsic of explanatory circum-
stances, and if the words are unambiguous and incapable of an
innocent meaning they may be declared libelous as a matter of
law." '68  The holding of the trial court was affirmed, but this
result was attained entirely on the basis that the federal law
made it possible for the postal authorities to exclude the plain-
tiff's newspaper from the mails for other, and entirely innocent,
reasons. Thus, reasoned the court, the defendant's article was
not fairly susceptible of any defamatory imputation.
It should be noted that none of the Illinois cases noted above,
nor those cited in the LaGrange Press case, are authority for the
proposition that it would be improper to draw innuendoes in a
complaint based on defamation, provided adequate foundation
had been laid and the inference drawn was not an irrational one.
67 252 Ill. App. 482 (1929), cert. den. 256 Ill. App. xlviii.
68 252 Ii1. App. 482 at 485. The court cited Dowie v. Priddle, 216 Il. 553 (1905);
Schmisseur v. Kreilich, 92 Ill. 347 (1879) ; Slaughter v. Johnson, 181 Ill. App. 693
(1913); Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.
(2d) 255 (1926) ; Burr v. Winnett Times Pub. Co., 80 Mont. 70, 258 P. 242 (1927) ;
and Kee v. Armstrong, Byrd & Co., 75 Okla. 84, 151 P. 572, on rehearing in 175 P.
836 and 182 P. 494 (1919).
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If anything, these cases indicate, at least impliedly, that this
method of pleading would be at least appropriate and, at times,
even necessary. In effect, therefore, the doctrine of the Brewer
case represents an importation from other jurisdictions, made
without consideration either as to its logic or its justification and
under the mistaken belief that precedent commanded its applica-
tion.
Once the manner of pleading the gravamen has been deter-
mined upon, little more remains to be said. The plaintiff will,
in all probability, wish to charge that the disparaging statements
about him, which he has attributed to the defendant, were in fact
false. Since this is presumed to be the case, no proof need be
entered by the plaintiff to substantiate this allegation, unless the
defendant should place the matter in issue by raising the defense
of truth in the answer."9 Even then, the burden of proof would
be on the defendant" so the question of innocence, therefore,
offers little obstacle to the plaintiff, at least during the pleading
stage. Whether the allegation could safely be omitted, however,
is a matter of some doubt.7'
Bearing in mind those distinctions which have been drawn
regarding the difference between defamation per se and not
per se72 with respect to the matter of pleading damages, the com-
plaint may have to be rounded out with a paragraph in which the
pleader would have to charge, by way of aggravation, the par-
69 Newell, op. cit., § 524; 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander, § 217, pp. 327-8. Illinois
is probably in accord with this proposition. See Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing
Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N. E. 587 (1919), and the abstract opinion in Kulesza v. Alliance
Printers & Publishers, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 231, 47 N. E. (2d) 547 (1943). A recent
case, however, reached the rather disturbing conclusion that where a charge Is not
libelous per se the plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity as well as malice and
special damages: Tiernan v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 1 Ill. App. (2d) 150,
116 N. E. (2d) 896 (1953).
70 Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N. E. 587 (1919); 53
C. J. S., Libel and Slander, § 217, pp. 327-8.
71 The case of Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distilling Corp., 288 Ill. App.
79, 5 N. E. (2d) 610 (1937), might be considered as indicating that the allegation
is essential. See also 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander, § 167, pp. 263-4.
72 See notes 39 to 47, ante.
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ticular items of special damage which he believes have been proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's wrongful acts. The specifica-
tion thereof will necessarily vary from case to case, so it is not
possible to do more than suggest that the items claimed must not
be speculative in character and must be such as can be measured
in dollar equivalents"3 but may be increased by a claim for ex-
emplary damages so long as the total does not exceed the amount
of the ad damnum stated in the complaint.
74
73 McCormick, op. cit., p. 415 et seq.
74 The complaint may be amended, according to the abstract decision in the case
Hunsley v. Wurl, 341 Ill. App. 247, 93 N. E. (2d) 151 (1950), in the event the verdict
is for a larger sum than that stated in the complaint. On the subject of the right to
secure exemplary damages, see Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77 (1876), and Lion Oil
Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 252 Ill. App. 92 (1929).
